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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bennett Robert Scales appeals from his judgment of conviction upon a 
jury's finding him guilty of felony domestic violence. Scales asserts the district 
court abused its discretion when the court denied Scales' motion, midway 
through trial, to continue until the next day so Scales could feel "a little bit more 
relaxed" in deciding whether to testify. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Scales with felony domestic violence against his 
girlfriend, with whom he lived, for hitting her, breaking her nose. (R., pp. 5-6.) 
The matter proceeded to trial about five months later. (See Tr., p. 8.) The state 
presented testimony from the victim, the victim's treating physician, the victim's 
mother (who lived with the victim and Scales and witnessed the incident), the 
patrol officer who responded to the incident, and the domestic violence detective 
assigned to the case. (See Tr., pp. 88-165.) After the state rested, the trial court 
proposed a brief recess, which was taken. (Tr., p. 165, Ls. 8-16.) 
Following the break, defense counsel indicated that Scales would take the 
stand, so the trial court began a colloquy with Scales about his decision and right 
to testify. (Tr., p. 165, L. 18 - p. 167, L. 18.) During this colloquy, Scales asked, 
"can I actually do this like tomorrow?" and defense counsel said, "He is a little 
emotional." (Tr., p. 166, L. 22 - p. 167, L. 1.) The trial court then suggested, 
"why don't you go ahead and talk things over [with counsel]. Let's take a real 
five-minute break." (Tr., p. 167, Ls. 16-18; see Tr., p. 166, Ls. 24-25.) After the 
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second recess, the trial court said, "well, it's 3:55. We do need to continue 
today. I'm not willing to continue until tomorrow. So feel free to drink some 
water, and we have some cough drops here. Just take your time. But we are 
going to proceed today." (Tr., p. 168, Ls. 19-23.) 
Defense counsel stated for the record, "[Scales] has rethought things, 
Judge, and if the court insists upon going forward today, it's his position that he 
does now wish to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and not testify." (Tr., p. 
169, Ls. 2-6.) This exchange followed: 
THE COURT: Well, that's entirely Mr. Scales' decision, but it's 3:55. 
The jury is here. The jury is present. This is the day 
set for trial, so we need to proceed. 
If you want to drink some water or something, 
there is no reason why you can't just feel like taking 
all the time you need to say whatever it is you would 
like to say to the jury. 
THE DEFENDANT: That wasn't what I wanted, was take all the time. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you are certainly free to testify if you want 
to. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's all right. 
THE COURT: It's your call. And like I said, you know, it's not 
unusual for people to feel, you know, a little stressed 
at this situation, but just take your time. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, that's all right. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, do you want to testify or don't you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You don't want to testify? 
THE DEFENDANT: One, I'm being pushed a little too quickly here. 
THE COURT: Well, this is the time set for trial. 
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THE DEFENDANT: It's the time set for trial, but it's also my life, ma'am, 
up here. 
THE COURT: Umm-hmm. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm the one - if this all goes wrong, I'm the one that 
goes out here and sits. It won't be you guys. 
THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay? You will all get to go home. You get to go 
home, see your children. I don't. 
THE COURT: Well, it's entirely your decision if you want to testify. 
THE DEFENDANT: Let's get on with the jury, then. 
THE COURT: And-
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Just to be clear, Judge - Mr. Scales, you are 
choosing, then, not to testify? 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to testify at all. 
THE COURT: Well, it's your -
THE DEFENDANT: I won't be rushed into it. I would rather file a motion. 
THE COURT: I don't see why it's rushed into it, Mr. Scales. This is 
the day set for trial. I understand that earlier you 
were feeling a little emotional about things, but there 
is nothing wrong with that, and I don't see what 
benefit there would be in starting tomorrow. 
It doesn't seem - I have trouble understanding 
why it would be any better to start any particular time 
later. 
THE DEFENDANT: I would be a little bit more relaxed, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry, but it is - trials are stressful. 
THE DEFENDANT: Let's get on with it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, it's entirely your choice. It's entirely your 
decision, if he wishes [sic] to testify. You have 
discussed it. He doesn't want to testify. We will 
proceed with the jury. 
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(Tr., p. 169, L. 7 - p. 171, L. 23.) The court called the jury back in, and the 
defense rested. (Tr., p. 171, L. 24-p. 172, L. 5.) 
The jury found Scales guilty of domestic violence. (R., p. 76.) Scales 
timely appealed the judgment. (R., pp. 81-82, 87-89.) 
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ISSUE 
Scales states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion, promoting a myopic 
insistence on expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 
a recess, and in so doing, eviscerated several of Mr. Scales' 
constitutional rights. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Scales failed to show the court abused its discretion in denying a request, 
midway through trial, for a continuance until the following day so Scales could 
feel "a little bit more relaxed" in deciding whether to testify? 
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ARGUMENT 
Scales Has Failed To Show The Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying A 
Request, Midway Through Trial, For A Continuance Until The Following Day So 
Scales Could Feel "A Little Bit More Relaxed" In Deciding Whether To Testify 
A. Introduction 
Scales argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request 
for a continuance after the state rested its case, so he could have until the 
following day to decide whether to testify. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-13.) Scales 
contends the trial court's decision was the result of a "myopic insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 1.) However, because Scales never identifies a worthy justification for the 
delay, nor any substantial right impacted by the denial of the requested delay, he 
fails to show the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, his arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 
(1999); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481,927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"Unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by 
reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only 
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion." Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 
P.2d 738, 746 (1999) (citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 203, 485 P.2d 144, 
147 (1971)). See also State v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 P.2d 881, 885 
(1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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C. Scales Has Not Identified A Justifiable Reason For, Or Constitutional 
Right Implicated By, His Mid-Trial Request For A Continuance, And Thus 
Fails To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His 
Request 
"Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling 
trials." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (quoted in State v. Cagle, 126 
Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)). The burden of 
"assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors" at the place and time for trial 
"counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons." kl Accordingly, 
trial courts are afforded "broad discretion ... on matters of continuances." kl 
To show an abuse of scheduling discretion the appellant must demonstrate that 
his substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed with trial as 
scheduled. See Evans, 129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885. In determining 
whether the denial of a continuance was "so arbitrary as to violate due process," 
the appellate courts must look to the circumstances of the case, particularly "the 
reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied." Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (citations omitted). 
In Ungar, the appellant had been a hostile but key witness for the 
prosecution in a state criminal trial. kl at 576. Shortly after that trial, the trial 
court judge served a show-cause order on Ungar due to Ungar's disruptive 
comments and refusal to answer questions in the trial. kl at 580-81. Ungar 
requested and was granted two brief continuances, then denied (at least) one 
other motion to continue, before his show-cause hearing for contempt. kl at 
581, 590. The trial court judge determined that Ungar was "afforded sufficient 
time to hire counsel who would be available at the time of the scheduled 
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hearing." kt_ at 590. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding that the "five 
days' notice given petitioner was not a constitutionally inadequate time to hire 
counsel and prepare a defense" in the circumstances of that case. kt. 
As in Ungar, Scales has failed to show he was given a constitutionally 
inadequate time to prepare his case. Scales had five months from when he was 
charged until his trial, to confer with counsel and wrestle with the decision 
whether to testify. (R., pp. 5-6; Tr., p. 8.) The five witnesses who testified for the 
prosecution had all been identified in the state's witness list, two months before 
trial. (R., pp. 51-52.) The main witness against Scales - the victim - testified at 
the preliminary hearing nearly four months before trial. (See Prelim Tr.) The 
victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing is entirely consistent with her 
testimony at trial, and with the trial testimony of her mother who witnessed the 
assault. (Compare Prelim Tr. with Tr.) Indeed, Scales has not identified any 
reason why evidence from the state's case at trial - or any other reason -
necessitated additional time for him to decide whether to testify. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) 
The United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to a ruling 
denying a continuance requested midway through trial. Morris v. Slappy, 461 
U.S. 1 (1983) In that case, the defendant argued a continuance was needed 
because his counsel lacked sufficient time to prepare after taking over from prior 
counsel who was incapacitated by a medical emergency. kt. at 5-10. The 
Court's decision in Slappy included a detailed discussion of the evidence 
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supporting that, despite Slappy's assertions, his counsel "was fully prepared and 
'ready' for trial." kl at 5-10, 12. 
"In our view," the Court said, "the record shows that the trial judge 
exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of the accused and extraordinary 
patience with a contumacious litigant." kl at 13. Regarding the timing of 
Slappy's request, the Court concluded: 
... the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondents' 
[sic] midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have [his prior 
counsel] represent him. On this record, it could reasonably have 
concluded that respondent's belated requests to be represented by 
[prior counsel] were not made in good faith but were a transparent 
ploy for delay. 
kl at 13. The Court thus rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 
intermediate holding that a continuance had been necessary to ensure that 
Slappy's representation by counsel was constitutionally adequate and 
"meaningful." kl at 13-14. 
Applying Slappy here, Scales' argument also fails. As in Slappy, Scale's 
request for continuance came mid-way through trial. And as in Slappy, the 
record fails to support the need for a continuance. In Slappy, the defendant had 
at least asserted a legal ground for continuance - the need for adequate 
preparation by counsel - although the Court suggested it was a "transparent ploy 
for delay." kl at 13. But here, Scales' asserted reason for a continuance was 
that it would permit him to "be a little bit more relaxed." (Tr., p. 171, Ls. 15-16.) 
Scales expressed that the decision whether to testify was stressful, 
indicating, "if this all goes wrong ... [y]ou will all get to go home ... [and] see 
your children. I don't." (Tr., p. 170, Ls. 11-17.) The trial judge sympathized that 
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"trials are stressful," (Tr., p. 171, L. 18), and he could take his time, drink some 
water, but "[t]he jury is here. The jury is present. This is the day set for trial, so 
we need to proceed" (Tr., p. 169, Ls. 8-14). As already discussed, nothing 
unforeseen happened during the state's case to justify the requested additional 
time for Scales to decide whether to testify. 
Without more, the difficulty of deciding whether to testify and the resultant 
stress of having to make the decision simply do not warrant more time for the 
defendant to decide. If the difficulty and stress of deciding whether to testify 
required a continuance, as Scales proposes, then all requests for continuance 
on that basis would be justified; any denial of such continuance would be an 
abuse of discretion. Such a rule would eviscerate the trial court's discretion to 
decide the appropriateness of the motion. This is contrary to the well-
established standard that whether to grant continuances are in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Nunez, 133 Idaho at 21, 981 P.2d at 746; Hudson, 
129 Idaho at 481, 927 P.2d at 454. Because Scales asserted no valid factual or 
legal justification for his requested continuance, he has failed to show the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
Scales cites two decisions addressing the denial of a continuance in the 
context of a request for new counsel. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 
800 (1993); State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988). In 
Pratt, the Idaho Supreme Court noted, "because the constitutional right to 
counsel is at issue, we review the record independently to determine if this 
constitutional right has been abridged." 125 Idaho at 555, 873 P.2d at 809; see 
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also Carman, 114 Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at1209. Pratt advised the court his 
family had retained private counsel who he wished to replace his court-appointed 
public defender, but that his chosen counsel needed an additional two weeks to 
prepare. k;L_ The Court identified seven factors to consider in determining 
whether a continuance should be granted in these circumstances. k;L_ The same 
factors were addressed in Carman, 114 Idaho at 793, 760 P.2d at 1209. 
In Scales' case, the constitutional right to counsel of his choice was not at 
issue. Accordingly, the analysis employed in Pratt and Carman - triggered by 
the right-to-counsel issue - is inapplicable here. Scales attempts to apply the 
Pratt and Carman analysis, but without "those factors [that] are not relevant to 
the issue in this case." (Appellant's brief, p. 6 n. 1.) However, Scales cites no 
legal authority justifying this partial-application of Pratt and Carman absent a 
deprivation of the right to proceed with counsel of choice. Without a deprivation 
of an actual right, the factors used in Pratt and Carman simply do not apply. 
Even considering the factors from Pratt and Carman, selected and 
discussed in appellant's brief, Scales' arguments still fail. Those factors include: 
the timing of the motion; the requested length of delay, including 
whether the delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; the 
number, if any, of similar continuances sought by the defendant; 
inconvenience to witnesses; [and] any prejudice to the prosecution 
Pratt, 125 Idaho at 555, 873 P.2d at 809. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.) 
Although Scales' requested delay was brief, the timing of the request -
midtrial - supports its denial. See Slappy, 461 U.S. 1. The delay would have 
impacted the prosecution and state's witnesses because, if Scales chose to 
testify, some witnesses might have been needed for rebuttal. It is true that 
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Scales was not "manipulative" in that he did not disguise a mere delay tactic 
under valid substantive grounds. Instead, Scales candidly sought more time so 
that he could "be a little bit more relaxed." (Tr., p. 171, Ls. 15-16.) But even 
absent bad faith, a delay for delay's sake is not a valid legal ground for 
continuance. 
Scales' efforts to couch his issue in terms of constitutional principles is 
unavailing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.) There is no constitutional right to be 
more relaxed. Scales has not shown that he lacked a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard, to consult with counsel, or to decide whether to testify, in the nearly 
five months leading up to his trial. The record simply does not support that 
Scales was denied a substantial right or that the lack of a continuance denied 
him a fair trial. He has failed to show otherwise, or to cite to any legal authority 
supporting his argument that a constitutional right was violated. Accordingly, 
Scales has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his requested continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Scales' judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2014. 
DAPH E J. HUANG 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of May, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
DJH/pm 
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